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The COVID-19 crisis: what explains cross-
country differences in the pandemic’s 
short-term economic impact? 
 




The COVID-19 pandemic has caused the most universal health and socio-economic crisis in 
recent history. However, the magnitude of the economic damage has differed widely; some 
countries were hit particularly hard, while others have managed to weather the storm much 
better. In this paper, we employ a cross-country analysis to identify factors that help explain 
the differences in the growth impact of the COVID-19 shock. Our findings underscore the 
critical role of balancing health and economic concerns in managing the pandemic as both a 
country’s exposure to the coronavirus and the stringency of containment measures are 
strongly correlated with its growth performance. In addition, our results shed light on several 
aspects of economic resilience. Good governance, provision of fiscal support and strong 
macroeconomic fundamentals all helped cushion the economic impact. By contrast, a lack of 
economic diversification – reflected in overreliance on the tourism sector or oil production – 
has significantly amplified the shock.  
JEL Classification: E61, E66, H12, H51, H63, I15, I18, O11, O47,  
Keywords: COVID-19; growth performance; transmission of shocks; economic resilience. 
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The COVID-19 pandemic has caused the most universal health and socio-economic crisis in 
recent history. According to data from Johns Hopkins University, 176 out of the 179 countries 
covered in the World Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP) 2021 registered coronavirus 
cases in 2020 (United Nations, 2021). At the same time, almost all of the world’s Governments 
implemented far-reaching containment measures to slow the spread of the virus, causing 
massive disruptions to economic activity. No country has been left unscathed by the 
economic fallout from the pandemic. In each of the 179 countries, GDP growth in 2020 is 
estimated to have been slower than expected prior to the outbreak of COVID-19.  
 
While the crisis has affected every single country in the world, the magnitude of the economic 
damage has differed widely. Many countries, especially in Africa and East Asia, have been able 
to limit the impact of the pandemic, resulting in only mild downward revisions in economic 
growth. By contrast, a large number of countries in Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean 
and South Asia, have experienced GDP contractions of historic proportions. The growth 
performances of China and India are a striking example of the uneven economic impact of the 
crisis.  Prior to the pandemic, both countries were expected to see annual GDP growth of 6 to 
7 per cent in 2020.2 In the updated projections of the WESP 2021, China’s GDP growth was 
revised downward by about 3.5 percentage points, whereas India’s growth was revised 
downward by almost 15 percentage points.  
 
This raises the question why the crisis has hit some countries particularly hard, while others 
have managed to weather the storm much better. Given the complex dynamics of the 
pandemic, many factors are potentially linked to countries’ economic performance. For 
example, one may ask how strongly the health and economic shocks have been correlated; 
how much the duration and severity of containment measures have impacted economic 
growth; to what extent monetary and fiscal support measures have helped mitigate the 
economic downturn; and what role country characteristics, such as dependence on tourism 
or oil, and macroeconomic fundamentals have played.   
 
2 See United Nations (2020). All annual figures refer to the calendar year.  
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In this study, we empirically examine a broad range of potential explanatory factors, assessing 
their relevance for the observed cross-country differences in the pandemic’s impact on 
economic growth in 2020. We focus on revisions in GDP growth forecasts, based on 
projections by the United Nations’ Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Following the analysis by Berkmen, Gelos, Rennhack 
& Walsh (2009) for the case of the global financial crisis, we employ cross-country OLS 
regressions for a global sample of developed, developing and transition economies.  
 
Our findings underscore two key areas for government action, which could help dampen the 
impact of future pandemics or similar crises. First, countries’ exposure to the pandemic and 
the stringency of containment measures are among the most important determinants of 
downward GDP adjustments. Hence, balancing health and economic concerns in countries’ 
closure and containment policy is critical. Further public health and epidemiological research 
on the effectiveness of different policy responses is needed to guide political decisions and 
strike an optimal balance between protecting public health and avoiding unnecessary 
disruptions to the economy. Second, we find evidence that strong structural and 
macroeconomic fundamentals and effective economic management provided some degree 
of insulation against the economic downturn. Countries with good governance, more 
diversified production structures, better pre-pandemic economic performance and lower 
debt-servicing burdens generally experienced smaller downturns in 2020.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the data used in the 
empirical analysis, with the explanatory variables capturing different aspects of the economic 
shock. Section III briefly discusses regional trends in some key variables that are directly 
related to COVID-19, such as a country’s exposure to the pandemic, the stringency of 
containment measures and the fiscal response. Section IV presents the empirical 
methodology and the main results of our regression analysis; and section V concludes.  
II COVID-19: determinants of economic performance 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has played out differently across the world, with large disparities in 
economic outcomes. Our objective is to determine which factors help explain the observed 
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cross-country differences in the pandemic’s impact on GDP growth. We focus our analysis on 




In examining the pandemic’s adverse impact on economic output, we focus on revisions to 
GDP growth for 2020, comparing the latest available estimates with the respective forecasts 
that had been made prior to the outbreak of the pandemic.3 We use two alternative sources 
for the growth data: projections made in the United Nations’ World Economic Situation and 
Prospects 2020 and 2021 (released in January of each year); and projections made in the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) World Economic Outlook in October 2019 and October 
2020.4 Relying on annual rather than quarterly data allows us to abstract from potential 
differences in the cyclical positions of countries and to include a large number of countries in 




Our explanatory variables can be divided into five broad groups that capture different aspects 
of the economic shock faced by countries: (i) exposure to the pandemic; (ii) stringency of 
containment measures; (iii) fiscal response; (iv) governance; and (v) structural and 
macroeconomic vulnerabilities.6 
 
Exposure to the pandemic  
We use the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases and deaths as reported by Johns Hopkins 
University to account for countries’ exposure to the pandemic. The two indicators help assess 
 
3 Our approach implicitly assumes that the revisions to GDP growth in 2020 are exclusively attributable to 
factors related to COVID-19. While this assumption is not valid in a strict sense, the unprecedented magnitude 
of the crisis justifies this simplification.  
4 The 2020 projections by the United Nations and the IMF include data up to the third quarter of the year. For 
a subset of countries preliminary full-year estimates have become available. However, most national statistical 
offices will only release official 2020 GDP figures by the third quarter of 2021.  
5 A quarterly breakdown of growth trajectories in 2020 would severely restrict our sample and create a bias 
towards developed countries. 
6 We proxy the health dimension of the shock by incorporating countries’ exposure to the pandemic into our 
model. Many indicators related to health or social development conditions are highly correlated and are 
thereby largely captured by our exposure metric or GDP per capita level which we control for. The correlation 
coefficient between GDP per capita and the Human Development Index (HDI), for example, was 0.94 in 2019. 
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the global transmission of the virus, but do not provide a complete picture of the health 
impact of the pandemic. In fact, the true level of virus transmission is often significantly 
underestimated as many infected people are asymptomatic and testing capacities are limited. 
The number of undetected cases and deaths is particularly high in countries with weak 
healthcare systems and limited medical supplies. While both indicators are fraught with 
measurement problems, underreporting and underestimation are significantly less 
pronounced for deaths than cases. This is due to the fact that deaths are concentrated among 
severe cases who are more likely to have been tested; further, post-mortem testing corrects 
some of the undercount. Rahmandad, Lim, and Sterman (2020) estimate that throughout the 
summer of 2020, cumulative cases were 10.5 times higher than the official count; their 
estimated fatalities, on the other hand, exceeded the official count only by a factor of 1.5. 
 
Stringency of containment measures 
In response to the spread of the virus, governments worldwide have been implementing a 
broad range of containment measures. To account for the stringency of these measures, we 
use the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (Hale, et al., 2020), which aggregates 
high frequency data on five government response indicators: (i) school or workplace closings; 
(ii) cancellations or restrictions of public events and social gatherings; (iii) closures of public 
transport; (iv) stay-at-home orders; and (v) restrictions on national and international 




The pandemic has prompted the largest global fiscal expansion since World War II as 
governments aimed to cushion the health and economic damage. The most comprehensive 
source for fiscal stimulus data is the IMF’s ‘Fiscal Monitor Database of Country Fiscal 
Measures in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic’ (International Monetary Fund, 2021). This 
database summarizes key fiscal measures globally, distinguishing between different types of 
fiscal responses and quantifying their size. Fiscal stimulus is grouped into three categories, 
which have different budgetary implications in the short and long term (International 
 
7 Notably, the indicator does not capture how well policies are enforced, nor does it capture demographic or 
cultural characteristics and leniencies with regards to private restraint and compliance with public policy. 
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Monetary Fund, 2020): (i) additional spending or one-off tax cuts result in immediately higher 
budget deficits today, but only indirectly affect countries’ future balances through multiplier 
effects, or higher interest payments on rising debt levels; (ii) tax deferrals have a temporary 
effect – they increase debt levels and deficits today in order to provide liquidity to the 
taxpayers, but need to be eventually repaid in the future to settle the score; (iii) guarantees 
or liquidity support to companies in financial trouble can similarly raise debt levels in the short 




In times of crisis, good governance matters more than ever. The quality of governance played 
a critical role in countries’ immediate response to the pandemic and in the effective utilization 
of stimulus funds. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2010) reports on six dimensions of governance: (i) voice and accountability; (ii) 
regulatory quality; (iii) political stability and absence of violence; (iv) rule of law; (v) 
government effectiveness; and (vi) control of corruption. These indicators combine the views 
of a large number of enterprises, citizens, and expert survey respondents from over 30 data 
sources. In order to avoid overfitting of our model, we include one indicator at a time.   
 
Structural and macroeconomic vulnerabilities 
The crisis has hit different sectors of the economy in very different ways. In doing so, it has 
exposed the vulnerabilities associated with a lack of diversification in a country’s productive 
structure. The most severely affected sector has been tourism, with international arrivals 
declining by an estimated 74 per cent in 2020 (UNWTO, 2021). We capture a country’s 
dependency on the tourism sector by including tourism receipts as a share of GDP in our 
estimations. Oil prices and oil demand also collapsed in 2020. We therefore include countries’ 
oil rents – the difference between the value and the cost of total oil production – as a share 
 
8 As an alternative indicator we use the Economic Support index from the Oxford COVID-19 Government 
Tracker, which comprises of measures on (i) income support; (ii) debt/contract relief for households; (iii) fiscal 
measures; and (iv) provision of international support (Hale, et al., 2020). However, the indicator does not 
include support to firms or businesses and does not take into account the total fiscal value of economic 
support.  
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of GDP in our regressions. Both indicators are taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database.9  
 
Given the unique nature of COVID-19, another important question is whether, and to what 
extent, strong macroeconomic fundamentals have provided some kind of protection against 
the shock. Have countries that entered the pandemic with stronger economic positions 
experienced smaller contractions in 2020, all else equal? We focus on two aspects of 
macroeconomic fundamentals: First, we capture the overall public debt situation prior to the 
crisis, proxied by the total public debt service paid as a share of total government revenues  
or, alternatively, the government debt-to-GDP ratio.10 Second, we incorporate the strength 
of economic growth, measured by average GDP per capita growth in the three years prior to 
the crisis. 
 
Lastly, we are interested in potential effects from trade openness, measured as total 
merchandise exports as a share of GDP. Global trade in goods collapsed in the early stages of 
the pandemic, but has recovered significantly faster than after the global financial crisis in 
2008–09. For all structural and macroeconomic vulnerability variables, we use 2017–19 
averages to avert endogeneity problems and reduce the effect of outliers. 
III Descriptive evidence: regional trends 
 
To better understand the varying impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, this section reviews 
regional trends in countries’ epidemic trajectories, the policy responses, and the economic 
outcomes. This allows us to identify which regions and countries were hit particularly hard, 
which weathered the storm better, and which factors might have played a role. The review 
builds an important foundation for our regression analysis in the following section.  
 
Key takeaways are that the short-term economic fallout from the pandemic has differed 
widely. Namely, the economic shock in 2020 has been most severe in South Asia, Europe and 
 
9 As an alternative measure, we include the share of oil in total exports.  
10 As a robustness check, we include the total public debt service paid as a share of total government 
expenditures. 
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Latin America, while East Asia and the United States have experienced significantly smaller 
GDP revisions. In part, this may be explained by the massive fiscal spending in the United 
States, and strictly enforced early lockdowns in East Asia that curbed the spread of the virus 
and allowed a loosening of restrictions over the course of 2020.  
 
What further stands out is the challenging situation of many low-income countries, whose 
minimal fiscal response, coupled with stringent closure and containment policies over the 




On top of the devastating health crisis, COVID-19 has triggered the most severe global 
economic shock since the Great Depression. World gross product is estimated to have fallen 
by 4.3 per cent in 2020 (United Nations, 2021) – a downward revision by 6.8 percentage points 
compared to the pre-pandemic growth forecast of 2.5 per cent.  
Figure 1: Number of countries by size of 2020 GDP downward revision 
 
Source: United Nations (2020) and United Nations (2021). 
Note: According to UN country classification, developed economies include Australia, Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand, the United States of America, and the EU-28. Economies in transition consist of countries from South-
Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia. 
The impact on economic activity has differed vastly across countries and regions (figure 1). 
While about a quarter of the 179 countries covered by United Nations (2021) saw relatively 
mild GDP growth revisions between 0 and 6 percentage points, 14 countries experienced 



















United States registered comparatively small downward revisions of 4.4 and 5.6 percentage 
points, respectively (Figure 2). On the other end of the spectrum, Latin America and the 
Caribbean (8.9 ppt), Europe (9.2 ppt), and particularly South Asia (14.0 ppt) were hit 
extremely hard.  
Figure 2: Revisions of GDP growth for 2020, by region 
 
Source: United Nations (2020) and United Nations (2021). 
Note: Regional averages are calculated as GDP weighted averages of individual country growth rates, using 




By the end of 2020, more than 80 million people globally had been diagnosed with COVID-19 
and about 1.8 million deaths had been recorded. The cross-country differences in exposure 
to the virus have been extraordinarily large. The United States of America alone recorded 20 
million cases in 2020 – almost a quarter of all cases worldwide. Meanwhile, several other 
large economies, such as China (about 90,000 cases) or Japan (240,000 cases), were able to 
limit the spread of the virus. 
 
To make countries’ epidemic trajectories comparable, we calculate daily cumulative death 
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timelines, countries that were last exposed to the virus have lower coverage for later stages 
of the pandemic.11  
Figure 3: COVID-19 deaths per 100,000 people 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Johns Hopkins University. 
Note: Regional averages are weighted by the population size in 2019. 
 
As shown in figure 3, per capita fatalities in the United States, Europe, and Latin America and 
the Caribbean have been much higher than in other regions. Europe initially saw a very steep 
increase in the number of deaths but managed to flatten the curve between June and October 
2020. However, this positive trend did not last long as the region was hit hard by a second 
wave in late 2020 and early 2021 that was driven by seasonality and new, more infectious 
virus mutations. By contrast, per capita fatalities in the United States and Latin America and 
the Caribbean increased steadily throughout the year.  
 
Among other developed countries, New Zealand (0.5 per 100,000), Japan (2.6), and Australia 
(3.6) all sustained remarkably low fatalities during 2020.12 The success can partly be explained 
by the remote geographic locations of these countries and strict control of in- and outbound 
travel, which has allowed for efficient and comprehensive contact tracing. New Zealand, for 
 
11 Regional averages are only computed when at least 75 per cent of the region’s countries have data available 
for the respective epidemic phase. 
12 In many countries, death rates have increased considerably in early 2021. Japan, for example, was 
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example, was able to reduce prevalence of COVID-19 to an extent that allowed a fast and 
almost complete reopening of the economy. Between mid-May and mid-July 2020, no new 
COVID-19 cases were recorded in the country.  
 
Furthermore, many East Asian countries have so far weathered the pandemic remarkably well 
despite being hit early with the virus. Fatalities in the region averaged only 1.8 in 100,000 
people by the end of 2020. China (0.3), Singapore (0.5), Thailand (0.1) and the Republic of 
Korea (1.8) managed to keep the death toll from COVID-19 to a minimum. The reasons for 
this success are manifold and vary from country to country. Overall, the region benefited from 
strong crisis management systems, drawing on the experiences from previous epidemics, 
such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and the Middle East Respiratory 
Syndrome (MERS). Many of the region’s Governments responded swiftly and decisively to 
tame the spread of the disease, relying on extensive testing and using advanced information 
and communication technologies for public information sharing and contact tracing.13  
 
Africa also recorded remarkably few COVID-19 deaths during 2020 as the continent was 
largely spared from the catastrophic effects seen elsewhere. The very low reported death 
rate of 4.9 per 100,000 people partly reflects a significant number of undetected cases, 
resulting from limited testing capacities, weak institutions, and underfunded health services. 
However, underestimation likely explains only a fraction of the difference with other 
developing regions, such as Western Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean that have 
much higher incidence. Regional characteristics and measures taken by local governments 
have played an important role in keeping the prevalence rates low in Africa (Chitungo, Dzobo, 
Hlongwa, & Dzinamarira, 2020). First, resources for widespread HIV and tuberculosis testing 
were leveraged in the fight against COVID-19, and strict lockdowns were imposed early on. 
Secondly, African countries were experiencing significantly lower air travel from Asia at the 
onset of the pandemic compared to other regions (especially Europe and North America) and 
are generally less integrated into the global economy. Lastly, Africa’s younger population has 
made countries more resilient to the pandemic, given that older people are much more likely 
to suffer severe illness from COVID-19. Yet, there remains epidemiological uncertainty as to 
 
13 See for example Han et al. (2020) and Yang (2021).   
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why some regions were much more strongly affected by COVID-19 than others and how 




Figure 4 shows how containment measures have evolved in different groups of countries in 
the course of 2020.14 What stands out is that developing countries were, on average, 
considerably more cautious in easing restrictions than developed economies. Lockdowns and 
other movement restrictions were particularly severe in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
South Asia and Western Asia. East Asia, by contrast, was able to avert strict nationwide 
lockdowns, but maintained some restrictions throughout the year. 
 
Figure 4: Oxford stringency index (0 – 100) by country groups and developing regions  
       
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker.  
Note: The figure shows the unweighted regional averages for countries’ stringency trajectories after country’s 
respective first COVID-19 casualty. 
 
 
Thus, over the course of 2020, many developing countries have been facing even harsher 
lockdowns than developed countries. Moreover, movement restrictions tend to have a more 
severe impact on developing countries, which rely more heavily on in-person production and 
distribution of goods and services amid weaker digital infrastructure. In addition to the 
 
14 Regional figures are unweighted averages of country-level data. Due to the large number of countries, 
Europe dominates the category ‘developed economies’. Using population- or GDP-weighted averages would 
bias the results strongly towards a region’s largest economies (such as China for East Asia and India for South 
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negative short- and medium-term effects on economic activity, the lockdowns threaten to 
damage human capital in the long run. In many developing countries, school closures and lack 
of access to distance learning options have severely disrupted education, potentially leading 
to a ‘lost generation’ (UNICEF, 2020). In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, it is estimated that 




The worldwide fiscal response in 2020 has been estimated at a staggering $14.8 trillion,  
accounting for over 17 per cent of the 2019 world gross product (International Monetary 
Fund, 2021). This makes it the largest global fiscal response since World War II.15 
 
Figure 5: Fiscal stimulus per capita by region, 2020 (current US$) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the IMF database of fiscal policy responses to COVID-19.  
Note: Regional per capita averages are weighted according to population size as of 2019.  
 
The fiscal response is heavily skewed towards developed economies (Figure 5). The combined 
stimulus in developed countries makes up more than 80 per cent of the worldwide fiscal 
response (United Nations, 2021). In stark contrast, all African countries together account for 
less than 0.6 per cent of the total stimulus. This trend is even more striking in per capita terms: 
while developed countries’ fiscal support has amounted to $11,466 per capita, least 
developed countries (LDCs) averaged as little as $20. Thus, for every dollar of per capita relief 
 
15 Several countries, most importantly the United States, announced additional fiscal stimulus in early 2021. By 
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provided in the LDCs, over $580 were spent in developed ones. This gap dwarfs the disparity 
in income levels between the two groups. While many LDCs with minimal fiscal responses 
officially recorded relatively low rates of infections and fatalities, the number of undetected 
cases is probably significant. At the same time, many LDCs face challenges from the crisis 
similar to those in countries with higher per capita incomes: weaker global trade activity, 
reduced demand for goods and services; negative labour markets effects due to mobility 
restrictions and slower economic activity; and rising demands for the healthcare system. In 
contrast to developed countries, however, most developing countries lack fiscal space to 
mount a response, due in large part to their more limited borrowing capacity. This 
discrepancy will likely exacerbate cross-country inequalities going forward.  
 
Lastly, not only the size, but also the type of fiscal stimulus differs strongly across regions 
(Figure 5). While direct spending – in the form of fiscal stimulus or one-off tax cuts – makes 
up over 85 per cent of the United States’ total fiscal response, other developed economies 
such as European countries and Japan have relied more heavily on the provision of liquidity 
support. 
IV Methodology and regression results  
 
In this section, we assess the relevance of the various explanatory factors for the downward 
revisions in countries’ 2020 GDP growth. Following the analysis by Berkmen, Gelos, Rennhack 
& Walsh (2009) on the global financial crisis, we employ cross-country OLS regressions for a 
sample of 156 developed, developing and transition economies. Summary statistics are 
reported in the appendix table 2.  
 
Standardizing the explanatory variables helps simplify the interpretation of our results and 
allows us to directly compare the relative magnitude of the different explanatory variables. 
Our estimated coefficients indicate the amount of GDP growth revisions associated with a 
one standard deviation increase in our dependent variable, all else equal. Hence, the larger 
the coefficient, the larger its impact on economic growth.  
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The main findings of our empirical analysis are summarized in Table 1. The estimated 
equations explain between 46 and 59 per cent of the observed cross-country variation (R2) in 
the revisions to economic growth. The findings are robust to the different model 
specifications and choice of indicators (see appendix 3). The White robust standard errors 
account for the possibility of heteroskedasticity in our data.  
 
Table 1: Cross-country regressions: drivers of GDP growth revisions 
Dependent variable: WEFM revision of 2020 GDP 
forecast 
 WEO revision of 2020 GDP 
forecast 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 










































































  -1.044*** 
(0.235) 
Observations 156 114  155 114 𝑅2  0.457 0.587  0.460 0.575 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.423 0.547  0.426 0.534 
Sources: Data from United Nations (2020), United Nations (2021), International Monetary Fund (2019), International Monetary Fund 
(2020), Oxford’s Coronavirus Government Response Tracker, World Development Indicator database, the IMF fiscal support database, the 
world governance indicators project, and UN DESA staff calculations.  
Note: Robust White standard errors are shown in parenthesis. The regression further controls for logged GDP per capita levels. Fiscal 
support is included in logged form. For tourism share of GDP, oil rents share of GDP, past GDP per capita growth, merchandise exports 
share of GDP, and debt servicing share of government revenue, 2017–2019 averages are used. 
Significance levels: *p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
 
Our empirical results confirm the complexity and multifaceted nature of the economic shock 
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Many of the factors identified earlier appear to have 
played a role in countries’ economic performance in 2020. The size of the estimated 
coefficients varies considerably, indicating substantial differences in the relative importance 
of the various channels.16  
 




Exposure to the pandemic 
The magnitude of the health shock has strongly affected growth performance. Countries with 
a higher number of COVID-19 deaths per capita have seen larger downward revisions in GDP 
growth, when controlling for other factors. One standard deviation (37.0) in COVID-19 deaths 
per 100,000 people is associated with a significant growth reduction of about one percentage 
point.  
 
Stringency of containment measures 
Stringent containment measures – while slowing the spread of the disease – have also been 
associated with larger downward revisions in GDP growth. According to our estimates, one 
standard deviation in countries’ 2020 average stringency (12.8) corresponds to a 0.96 
percentage point reduction in 2020 growth estimates all else equal. For Latin America and the 
Caribbean, which had the strictest closure and containment policy among all regions globally 
(59 or 4.6 SDs), this factor alone is associated with a growth revision of up to 4.4 percentage 
points. Countries with the most stringent and prolonged lockdowns, such as Argentina (71), 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia (77) and Honduras (73), were hit particularly hard. On the 
other hand, some countries managed to record sustained economic growth despite stringent 
closure and containment policies. Notably, China reported a high average stringency index of 
68 in 2020 but also registered an extremely low prevalence of COVID-related deaths at only 
0.32 deaths per 100,000 people, while successfully leveraging its strong macroeconomic 
fundamentals. As a result, China has been among the handful of countries that are estimated 
to have achieved positive growth in 2020. 
 
Fiscal response 
We also find support for the positive effect of fiscal stimulus on economic activity. While fiscal 
stimulus is negatively correlated with GDP revisions – as countries whose economies were 
more severely affected also employed larger fiscal measures – we find a positive relationship 
once we control for other covariates. The coefficients are significant when the IMF’s WEO 
revisions are used as the dependent variable. In this case, one standard deviation in the log 
of total fiscal per capita support is associated with a rise of about 0.9 percentage points in the 
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2020 GDP growth estimates.17 Thus, many developed economies would likely have faced even 
more severe economic contractions if they had not provided massive fiscal support. A case in 
point is the United States, where the per capita stimulus amounted to $12,178. According to 
our estimates, this was associated with output equivalent to 2.5 percentage points in GDP 
growth, potentially reducing the downward revision from about 8.0 to 5.5 percentage points.  
 
Governance 
In addition to the effects of fiscal stimulus, we also find some support for the hypothesis that 
good governance helped mitigate the economic shock. All six governance indicators are 
positively related to economic resilience in 2020 although the respective coefficients are only 
statistically significant in some cases. We obtain the strongest effects when using ‘voice and 
accountability’ as a measure of governance. The ‘voice and accountability’ factor indicates to 
what extent a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well 
as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media. In times of crisis, these 
aspects are crucial to hold governments accountable for their actions, prevent misallocation 
of resources, and promote trust in institutions and public information. We find that one 
standard deviation in the governance indicator is associated with a revision of GDP growth of 
1.3 percentage points. This places governance among the largest and most important 
channels in our regressions. We also obtain a statistically significant effect when including 
‘political stability and no violence’ as a governance measure (see appendix 2).  
 
Structural and macroeconomic vulnerabilities 
Our regression results suggest that macroeconomic and structural vulnerabilities have 
significantly amplified the shock. Most notably, the COVID-19 pandemic revealed the risks of 
heavy dependence on a single economic sector and a non-diversified export structure. 
Countries with a high dependency on tourism experienced especially sharp economic 
downturns in 2020. One standard deviation in tourism’s share of GDP (6.9 per cent) is 
associated with GDP growth revisions of 1.5 percentage points. This makes tourism 
dependency the channel with the largest impact on economic activity in all our regressions. 
The impact has been particularly devastating for small island developing States (SIDS), such 
 
17 Lack of statistical significance in the regressions that use data from WESP 2020 and 2021 may be due to data 
limitations, as we cannot control for all channels, or unobservable dynamics, which drive the negative 
correlation between GDP revisions and fiscal support. 
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as the Maldives, Vanuatu or the Bahamas, where the tourism sector makes up 60 per cent, 
31 per cent and 25 per cent of total GDP, respectively. For the Maldives, we estimate that the 
direct effect of the collapse in international tourism could account for approximately 13 
percentage points of the total GDP revision (28.4 percentage points) all else equal. 
 
Fuel dependency is similarly linked to the downward adjustments of GDP. The effect is, 
however, considerably smaller than for tourism. One standard deviation in oil rents’ GDP 
share (7.5 per cent) is associated with a GDP growth revision of about one percentage point. 
In part, this weaker effect may be explained by the faster-than-expected recovery of oil prices 
in the second half of 2020, which limited the damage to oil-exporting countries. Nonetheless, 
heavily oil-dependent countries such as Iraq (41.3 per cent) and Algeria (14.1 per cent), were 
disproportionately affected by the crisis. 
 
Finally, we find evidence that strong macroeconomic fundamentals have helped countries to 
better withstand the impacts of the crisis. Economies that had experienced faster economic 
growth in the three years before the pandemic (2017–19) were more resilient and 
experienced smaller downward revisions in GDP growth. One standard deviation in GDP per 
capita growth (5.3 per cent) is associated with an increase in revised GDP growth of up to 1.1 
percentage points across our four model specifications. Similarly, countries with lower debt 
service payments as a share of government revenues (or, alternatively, lower public debt-to-
GDP- and debt-service-expenditure ratios) have, all else equal, performed better. Here, one 
standard deviation in the debt servicing share of government revenues is associated with GDP 
growth revisions of 1.0 percentage points. According to these estimates, Greece’s debt 
servicing, which exceeds total government revenues by 62 per cent – equivalent to 2.0 
standard deviations – could account for up to 2.0 percentage points of the total GDP 
reduction in 2020 (10.3 per cent) all else equal. 
V Conclusion 
 
Throughout the twentieth century, three influenza pandemics have disrupted lives on a global 
scale; similarly, COVID-19 will likely not constitute the last global health crisis in many people’s 
lifetimes. Hence, it is crucial to learn from the unique challenges the COVID-19 pandemic has 
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posed for governments worldwide. Our analysis underscores three key steps governments 
can take to build capacities for limiting economic damage from future pandemics. First, 
countries should strive to reduce heavy dependency on single economic sectors. As in many 
other crises, lack of economic diversification – reflected in overreliance on the tourism sector 
or oil production – has become a major vulnerability during the COVID-19 pandemic. In fact, 
tourism dependency is the factor most strongly associated with downward revisions in GDP 
growth in our analysis. Second, having built macroeconomic resilience has been key in 
weathering the COVID-19 storm. Good governance, provision of fiscal support, low debt 
burdens and strong macroeconomic fundamentals all helped cushion the economic impact. 
Setting up or expanding social protection systems as part of the recovery can further 
contribute to strengthening economic resilience against future shocks by acting as an 
automatic stabilizer.  Developing countries – particularly those lacking comprehensive social 
protection systems – should carefully consider how they prioritize their spending and seek to 
build up such social safety nets as that will reduce their dependence on donor countries when 
the next crisis hits. In the meantime, multilateral efforts that aim to increase resilience in 
developing and least developed countries will be crucial in cushioning future crises’ shocks to 
the global economy. Lastly, balancing the trade-offs between health and economic concerns 
is among the biggest challenges governments are facing. Both COVID-related deaths (per 
100,000 people) and stringency of containment measures are strongly correlated with a 
country’s economic performance. It is vital to identify and implement measures that both 
curb the spread of the disease and limit unnecessary disruption to the economy. Further 
research on the effectiveness of different closure- and containment measures will be needed 
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Dependent variables   
UN WEFM revision of 2020 GDP forecast  World Economic Outlook (2019, 2020) 
IMF WEO revision of 2020 GDP forecast  World Economic Situation and Prospects 
(2020, 2021) 
   
Exposure to the pandemic   
COVID-19 cases per 100,000 in 2020 - Johns Hopkins University 
COVID-19 deaths per 100,000 in 2020 - Johns Hopkins University 
   
Stringency of containment measures   
Average stringency in 2020 - Oxford’s Coronavirus Government Response 
Tracker 
   
Fiscal support   
Total fiscal support per capita + IMF: Fiscal Monitor Database 
Fiscal support | Additional fiscal spending per 
capita 
+ IMF: Fiscal Monitor Database 
Fiscal support | Deferred revenue per capita + IMF: Fiscal Monitor Database 
Fiscal support | Liquidity support per capita + IMF: Fiscal Monitor Database 
Total fiscal support as a share of GDP + IMF: Fiscal Monitor Database 
Fiscal support | Additional fiscal spending as a 
share of GDP 
+ IMF: Fiscal Monitor Database 
Fiscal support | Deferred revenue as a share of 
GDP 
+ IMF: Fiscal Monitor Database 
Fiscal support | Liquidity support as a share of GDP + IMF: Fiscal Monitor Database 
Economic support index + Oxford’s Coronavirus Government Response 
Tracker 
   
Governance   
Governance: voice and accountability + The Worldwide Governance Indicators 
project 
Governance: political stability / no violence + The Worldwide Governance Indicators 
project 
Governance: government effectiveness + The Worldwide Governance Indicators 
project 
Governance: regulatory quality + The Worldwide Governance Indicators 
project 
Governance: rule of law + The Worldwide Governance Indicators 
project 
Governance: control of corruption + The Worldwide Governance Indicators 
project 
   
Structural and macroeconomic vulnerabilities 
Tourism receipts as a share of GDP - WDI Database 
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Tourism receipts as a share of exports - WDI Database 
Oil rents as a share of GDP - WDI database 
Oil share of exports - UN staff estimates 
Past GDP per capita growth + WDI database 
GDP per capita level + WDI database 
Merchandise exports as a share of GDP - WDI database 
Debt servicing as a share of total government 
revenue 
- World Economic Outlook April 2021  
Debt servicing as a share of total government 
expenditure 
- World Economic Outlook April 2021 
Debt to GDP ratio - WDI database 




Appendix Table A.2. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean St.dev. Min Max 
WEFM revision of 2020 GDP forecast 173 -8.29 3.77 -31.00 -0.30 
WEO revision of 2020 GDP forecast 168 -8.33 3.92 -25.86 -1.03 
COVID deaths per 100,000 163 28.30 37.03 0.00 169.23 
Stringency of containment measures 163 49.59 12.77 0.00 76.93 
Fiscal support 173 $1,741.39 $3,691.30 $0.00 $19,968 
Governance: voice and 
accountability  
169 -0.10 1.00 -2.19 1.69 
Tourism share of GDP 170 4.7% 6.9% 0.0% 60.1% 
Oil rents share of GDP 167 2.9% 7.5% 0.0% 42.0% 
Past GDP per capita growth 173 4.4% 5.3% -33.3% 29.4% 
Merchandise exports share of GDP 157 70.5% 21.6% 9.4% 110.8% 
Debt servicing share of government 
revenue 
125 44.5% 80.06% 0.4% 770.3% 
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Appendix Table A.2. List of countries included in regression analysis 
Afghanistan Cyprus Kenya Republic of Korea 
Albania Czech Republic Kuwait Republic of Moldova 
Algeria Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
Kyrgyzstan Romania 
Angola Denmark Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic 
Russian Federation 
Argentina Djibouti Latvia Rwanda 
Australia Dominican Republic Lebanon Saudi Arabia 
Austria Ecuador Lesotho Senegal 
Azerbaijan Egypt Liberia Serbia 
Bahamas El Salvador Lithuania Sierra Leone 
Bahrain Estonia Luxembourg Singapore 
Bangladesh Eswatini Madagascar Slovakia 
Barbados Ethiopia Malawi Slovenia 
Belarus Fiji Malaysia Solomon Islands 
Belgium Finland Mali South Africa 
Belize France Malta Spain 
Benin Gabon Mauritania Sri Lanka 
Bhutan Gambia (Islamic 




Georgia Mongolia Sweden 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Germany Morocco Switzerland 
Botswana Ghana Mozambique Tajikistan 
Brazil Greece Myanmar Thailand 
Brunei Darussalam Guatemala Namibia Timor-Leste 
Bulgaria Guinea Nepal Togo 
Burkina Faso Haiti Netherlands Trinidad and Tobago 
Burundi Honduras New Zealand Tunisia 
Cambodia Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of 
China 
Nicaragua Turkey 
Cameroon Hungary Niger Uganda 
Canada Iceland Nigeria Ukraine 
Central African Republic India Norway United Arab Emirates 
Chad Indonesia Oman United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern 
Ireland 
Chile Iran (Islamic Republic of) Pakistan United Republic of 
Tanzania 
China Iraq Panama United States of America 
Colombia Ireland Papua New Guinea Uruguay 
Comoros Israel Paraguay Uzbekistan 
Congo Italy Peru Vanuatu 
Costa Rica Jamaica Philippines Viet Nam 
Côte D'Ivoire Japan Poland Yemen 
Croatia Jordan Portugal Zambia 
Cuba Kazakhstan Qatar Zimbabwe 
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Appendix Table A.3. Alternative model specifications 
Dependent variable: WEFM Revision of 2020 GDP forecast 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 












































Tourism share of exports 
   
-1.757*** 
(0.312) 




























Debt servicing share of 
government Revenue  
-1.450*** 
(0.319)   




Observations 153 114 151 143 𝑅2  0.451 0.567 0.474 0.414 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.416 0.525 0.437 0.374 
Sources Data are taken from United Nations (2020), United Nations (2021), International Monetary Fund (2019), International Monetary 
Fund (2020), Oxford’s Coronavirus Government Response Tracker, World Development Indicator database, the IMF fiscal support 
database, the World Governance Indicators Project, and UN DESA staff calculations. 
Note: Robust White standard errors are shown in parenthesis. The regression further controls for logged GDP per capita levels. Fiscal 
support is included in logged form. For tourism share of GDP, oil rents share of GDP, past GDP per capita growth, merchandise exports 
share of GDP, and debt servicing share of government revenue, 2017–2019 averages are used. 
Significance levels: *p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
